Perfect being theology holds that God is, well, a perfect being. However, the meaning of "perfect" in this context is ambiguous. Usually it is associated with classical theism, which holds that God is omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and so forth. But these concepts are also heavily debated.
While it would be nice if we could avail ourselves of the testimony of some special revelation, like an inspired written text, I personally do not think there are any plausible candidates for an authentic special revelation. I used to treat the Bible as a divine revelation, but I came to reject that view (and still reject it) for reasons that I've discussed elsewhere. I've never been drawn to the Quran or any other religious text, and I have some reasons for doubting that God would communicate to us through written texts anyway (although I freely admit that I could be wrong). As a result, I am limited to what I can learn from philosophy and natural theology as well as from personal experience.
For a long time, then, I considered myself a believer in some kind of basic theism, but agnostic about the God of "classical theism" (by which I mean the God of perfect being theology), especially since I was skeptical of whether there was any way to make coherent sense of a concept like omniscience. I believed in the existence of something Godlike, but was not sure what more could be said. So perfect being theology seemed interesting and attractive, but unattainable, especially in light of my rejection of Christian theism. I was also (and still am) very sensitive to the fact that my understanding of the world is heavily influenced by my environment and upbringing, and so I have a tendency to feel hesitant about putting too much stock in what I think (which is, of course, self-defeating).
I should add that this is why I struggled for a long time with the question of whether I should think of myself as a deist. I will probably write about this more in the coming weeks, but the answer to that, as I have been learning recently, seems to be no. As far as I can tell, I am not a deist. But what about perfect being theism?
In recent years my doubts about perfect being theology have been significantly assuaged. In fact, I think it's fair to say that I no longer see any good reason to think that the God of classical theism couldn't exist, and I've moved from agnosticism to belief. I will summarize my reasons here, although I won't try defending them, since that's a huge project. I am hoping to eventually get all of my thoughts on each of these issues organized here on the blog and, ultimately, written out in book form. For now, I will stick with the summaries.
Personal Experience
In this first section I will talk about beliefs based on personal experience. I used to think that these beliefs were the weakest of anything mentioned here, but the older I get, the more weight they carry for me. They are probably more important to me now than any of the actual arguments.
On the basis of personal experience, I hold what I take to be a properly basic belief that there is a supreme moral authority "behind" the universe that demands right behavior from me and that is displeased with wrong behavior. This is my interpretation of conscience. I take it as a moral authority distinct from myself and from the values that were instilled in me by my parents and culture, because I know that it does not come from me, and it seems to override my family and cultural values. It seems to have real moral authority.
This could be called an appeal to my moral experience, but I think it also falls into the category of religious experience. This supreme moral authority, if it's to make any good sense, would probably need to be something like a mind. It feels very much like a someone who wants me to do certain things and to avoid doing certain other things. It must be a supreme moral authority (or at least, a very high moral authority), otherwise its will for me would not make any difference as to whether my behavior was actually right or wrong. Whoever's voice I hear in my conscience, it speaks with authority that I cannot disagree with, try as I might. When I do something that it tells me is wrong, I know it is wrong even if I try to make excuses.
I also believe, on the basis of this same kind of experience, that this moral authority cares about people, including me (because I can feel the sense of grief and injustice that wells up in me when people get hurt, and I don't find this to be simply a reflection of my own personal preferences). I believe that it hates the brutal victimization of people that happens all the time. Since it presents itself to me as an authority, I believe that it really has authority over the physical world and over me, that it must be very wise and powerful (if it really is supremely good and authoritative), and that something about its nature or character is revealed in the beauty and joy that I encounter in the world and in my own life.
It seems like these sorts of beliefs could easily be mistaken, and they naturally raise the problem of evil. But I find it impossible to think that the voice of my conscience does not actually correspond to moral reality. In fact, the more suffering and injustice I witness and experience, the less inclined I am to think that my beliefs based on this experience are irrational. I think I need to take them very seriously. If anyone were to tell me that I am irrational for thinking this way, it would not carry any conviction for me, because their doubts seem baffling to me, and they are overwhelmed in my mind by my experience itself.
Not only that, but there is a pragmatic aspect to these beliefs as well. I can't imagine being able to function in the world or maintain any sort of peace of mind whatsoever if I thought that all of the convictions mentioned above were wholly illusory. And in light of what I have been learning about properly basic beliefs, I think it's perfectly rational to continue holding these beliefs unless I have a compelling reason to do so, and I am not aware of any such reason.
Arguments from Natural Theology
In this second section, I will talk about what I believe based on various arguments in natural theology. These are usually thought of as arguments for the existence of God, and sometimes they are criticized for not actually proving "God." This criticism never seemed very interesting to me, since I am more interested in what the arguments actually do prove. Again, I am not defending these arguments here. I am just identifying the ones that resonate with me and explaining what I take away from them.
I've arranged these in a certain way just to give the discussion a sort of logical flow. The principle of parsimony, better known as Ockham's razor, plays an important role in my thinking here, and it will be mentioned a few times. As I understand it, it's the principle that explanatory entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. In other words, don't assume the existence of multiple causes when one can get the job done. All references related to Ockham's razor are written in italics. I don't know why, it just seemed like a good stylistic choice.
- On the basis of the Kalam cosmological argument, I conclude that there is an uncaused, beginningless, immaterial, enormously powerful creator of the universe who (at least in the absence of the universe) is changeless, timeless, and spaceless.
- On the basis of a restricted version of the principle of sufficient reason, I conclude that the uncaused first cause exists necessarily, and thus eternally.
- On the basis of the fine-tuning of the physical universe and its mathematically elegant structure, I conclude that the creator of the universe must be highly intelligent.
- On the basis of the argument from reason, I conclude that persons have free will in the libertarian sense, that mental causation is possible, that non-physical minds exist, and that ultimate reality must therefore be a transcendent, supremely rational mind with creative powers.
- On the basis of Ockham's razor, I conclude that this transcendent mind is identical to the transcendent, personal creator of the universe established on other grounds.
- On the basis of the moral argument, I conclude that there is a necessarily existing, perfectly good, supremely authoritative personal being who cares about our moral behavior, and who cares about our well-being. I also conclude that we will be held accountable in some way for our moral choices, that we are obligated to make good choices and become good people.
- On the basis of evolutionary theory, I conclude that the authoritative, perfectly good being is likely to be creatively involved in the world in some way, since the emergence of creatures from blind evolutionary processes who just so happen to have real moral awareness seems highly improbable.
- On the basis of Ockham's razor, I conclude that the necessarily existing, supremely authoritative, perfectly good being is identical to the transcendent, supremely rational, personal, necessarily existing creator of the universe.
- On the basis of the argument from evil I conclude that moral evil results from free will, that pain and suffering are not incompatible with the findings of the moral argument, and that ultimately justice will prevail, so that those who strive to be good will be rewarded and those who do not will be held accountable.
- On the basis of the argument from religious experience, I conclude that many other people have a similar experience to me, and thus similar grounds for the same kind of properly basic belief that I hold.
In light of the apparent plausibility of these arguments, I have reason to believe in a being who is (1) immaterial, (2) personal, (3) necessary, (4) eternal, (5) immensely powerful, (6) highly intelligent, (7) supremely rational, (8) perfectly good, (9) perfectly loving, and (10) perfectly just. Not only that, but this being seems to reveal itself to people in such a way that there is good reason to believe that it desires to make its will known and for people to respond appropriately.
The Coherence of Perfect Being Theology and One More Argument for God
In this last section, I will explain why I gravitate toward perfect being theology, and not just to a more ambiguous type of theism.
On the basis of coherence arguments, I conclude that a being's omnipresence could plausibly be inferred from its omnipotence, omniscience, and immateriality; that a being's omniscience could plausibly be inferred from its omnipotence and personhood; and that a self-existent being could exist (i.e., a being who is the sole ultimate reality), since there is no good reason to affirm the independent existence of abstract objects, and since I find the existence of such objects to be implausible anyway.
I don't know if one could deduce the existence of an omnipotent being from the existence of a transcendent, necessarily existing power that is capable of creating physical reality, but at the very least, the existence of such a being seems like it very well could be omnipotent, and the existence of an immensely powerful transcendent personal creator who exists necessarily certainly increases the probability that there is an omnipotent being.
Furthermore, on the basis of coherence arguments, I have no reason to doubt the possibility of a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent, in addition to possessing the other qualities listed above. In short, I conclude that the existence of a perfect God (characterized as a "being than which nothing greater can be conceived" or a "maximally great being"), is both plausible and, as far as I can tell, metaphysically possible.
It is this last step that really makes the difference for me, and this is where one final argument from natural theology comes into play. On the basis of the modal ontological argument, I conclude that, since the existence of a perfect God is metaphysically possible, then such a God must exist. Of course, it's hard to make the jump from what seems possible to what really is possible (the difference between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility). But in light of everything I've said, I just see no good reason to think that a perfect God couldn't exist.
Final Thoughts
To speak of successfully "proving" God's existence is a fool's errand. I don't make any claims like that. I've been more interested in the question of whether a person could rationally accept perfect being theology without having to appeal to any sort of special revelation, like a sacred text. I think the answer is yes, although I think there's a lot more that could be said about it.
Originally I was going to comment on which arguments carried the most weight for me, but the older I get and the more I reflect on all of this, the more convincing I find all of this to be. In fact, I've noticed that the more I read of atheist literature, the less plausible atheism seems to me. I suppose if I had to pick one argument that felt most compelling to me, it would be the moral argument, although the power of this argument is ultimately rooted in my personal moral/religious experience.
I should say that I don't personally find the arguments from the fine-tuning of the universe and the applicability of mathematics to be very compelling as independent arguments for God. But in light of my belief, on other grounds, that there is a personal creator of the universe, I think that the fine-tuning of the universe and the applicability of mathematics serve as powerful evidence for what kind of creator it is.
Finally, the ontological argument is a very strange sort of argument. It is often characterized as an argument that is supposed to successfully deduce God's existence merely from the concept of God, and thus to provide a priori grounds for believing in God. I don't find the argument to be compelling at all in that sense. There are different versions of the ontological argument, and most of them carry no weight for me. But the modal version of the argument (as defended by people like Alvin Plantinga) carries weight for me because it confronts me with the question of whether I think a perfect God is the sort of being that could really exist. And in light of everything else I've said, I find myself answering honestly that I really do think he could. So I am led to embrace the conclusion. An atheist could deny the key premise—that the existence of such a being is metaphysically possible—but I have never seen a convincing reason to agree with that.