Reflections on the Kalam Cosmological Argument

Cosmological arguments are arguments that attempt to prove the existence of God by way of showing that there is an uncaused first cause or a being that exists necessarily (meaning that its non-existence is impossible). One version, called the Kalam cosmological argument, is an argument for an uncaused first cause based on the beginning of the universe. I've been discussing it in my recent posts, and at the risk of being repetitive, here is a typical way to formulate the argument:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

This is one of my favorite arguments in philosophy because it is very simple—two premises and a conclusion—and yet this simplicity is deceptive, because discussion of the argument tends to raise a host of interesting philosophical and scientific issues that are anything but simple, including:

Alex Vilenkin on the Beginning of the Universe, Part 4

As discussed in earlier posts, Alex Vilenkin's book, Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), has a lot of relevance to the Kalam cosmological argument, although he doesn't discuss it directly. The argument can be formulated as follows:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

First, he presents a theorem that he developed with two other physicists that proves that any universe that is (on average) expanding must have a beginning. So he would agree with the second premise of the argument. Second, he presents his own theory for the beginning of the universe, which holds that the universe tunneled into existence out of nothing, without a cause. So he would disagree with the first premise of the argument. I've already discussed those issues and expressed my agreements and disagreements. But to wrap up my discussion of this book, I wanted to share my thoughts about what Vilenkin says about God.

Alex Vilenkin on the Beginning of the Universe, Part 3

In the current series of posts I have been discussing Alex Vilenkin's book, Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006). In particular I've talked about the theorem he developed with Arvind Borde and Alan Guth which shows that the universe had a beginning. I will be interested to see if that theorem has been challenged or overturned in the past couple of decades—I don't believe it has, but I might do another post on that topic if I find anything interesting. In the meantime, I want to continue this discussion by sharing some very brief thoughts about Vilenkin's own explanation for where the universe came from. I think I might also do one more post briefly responding to Vilenkin's comments about why God would not make sense as the cause of the universe.

Alex Vilenkin on the Beginning of the Universe, Part 2

In my last post I mentioned that I have been reading Alex Vilenkin's book, Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006). I also mentioned that I was trying to understand Vilenkin's explanation of the theorem he developed with Arvind Borde and Alan Guth. It's actually pretty simple, but it involves Einstein's special theory of relativity, which always short-circuits my brain a little. But I think I understand what Vilenkin is saying now, and it's really interesting.

Alex Vilenkin on the Beginning of the Universe, Part 1

This week I've been reading Alex Vilenkin's book Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006). Vilenkin is a Russian theoretical physicist and his work has played an important role in our understanding of the Big Bang.