The Argument from Reason (Part 1)

In my opinion, the argument from reason is one of the most compelling arguments in natural theology. As with any argument in natural theology, what we call "the argument from reason" is actually a family of arguments. In fact, there are quite a lot of different arguments that count as arguments from reason. But there are four in particular that, taken together, push me toward theism. In this post I will discuss the first argument, which is probably the least complicated of the four, and which is also only aimed at one very specific type of atheism. But before I do that, I want to make some brief introductory comments about how this kind of argument is meant to work.

How the Argument from Reason Works

Any theory about the nature of reality ultimately depends on our ability to make rational inferences. This doesn't mean that all of our beliefs and knowledge depend on inferences, but when we consciously analyze our beliefs about the world, we have no choice but to rely on rational inferences. Whenever we consider some fact or some piece of evidence and draw a conclusion from it (say, by thinking through the best way to explain it), we are making what seem to be logical connections in our mind. In fact, we employ logical thinking in all sorts of contexts without realizing it.

To give a very mundane example, when you debate staying up late in order to keep watching a TV show that you've been enjoying, you probably have to consider the fact that staying up late will make you feel more tired the next day when you get up for work. In doing so, you are considering a logical relationship between two situations: staying up late, and the level of energy you will have when you wake up for work the next morning. That thought can be represented as a conditional premise: "If I stay up late tonight, then I will feel tired tomorrow morning." Then, if you decide to stay up late anyway, you do so with the expectation that you will feel tired the next morning. In that case, you have unwittingly made a rational or logical inference:

1. If I stay up late tonight, then I will feel tired tomorrow morning.
2. I will stay up late tonight.
3. Therefore, I will feel tired tomorrow morning.

The conclusion (step 3) follows from the two premises, which means that this is a logically valid argument or inference. As I said, this is a very mundane example, but we obviously make inferences like this all the time, even if we don't usually write them out in a syllogistic form like this. We certainly depend on these kinds of inferences when we form beliefs about the nature of reality. For instance, when an atheist concludes that God can't exist because there is too much evil and suffering in the world, they are making a rational inference. Now, whether the argument for atheism based on the problem of evil actually works is an entirely different discussion. But notice that, in order for the argument to work, one needs to assume that we actually can make valid inferences. This point is crucial. Neither theism nor atheism (nor any other belief about the nature of reality) would be able to assert itself on rational grounds if we were incapable of making valid logical inferences.

The argument from reason takes the validity of rational inference as a starting point. It assumes that we really can draw sensible, logical conclusions about the world based on this kind of reasoning. To claim otherwise would amount to a sort of skepticism that is ultimately self-defeating ("I have reasonably inferred that we cannot form reasonable inferences"). The next step of the argument from reason involves the claim that atheism, or some specific form of atheism, rests on an assumption (whether explicit or implicit) that calls the validity of our reasoning into question. If that's true, then atheism, or at least that version of atheism, can't be rationally affirmed. Some versions of the argument go further and claim that the issue in question can't be resolved unless something like theism is true.

Example of a Simple Argument from Reason

To give a good sense of how this kind of argument works, let me give an example of a simple argument from reason that focuses on one very specific kind of religious skepticism (too specific to be of much use in arguing for theism, but still interesting). I once talked to an agnostic who told me that people's religious beliefs are invalid because they are determined by their cultural context. At the time, I was still a Christian, and he told me that the only reason I accepted Christianity was because I grew up in America. Never mind the fact that, at the time, I had what I believed were good reasons for thinking that Christianity was true. The man was not impressed. He said that if I had grown up in Saudi Arabia, I would probably be a Muslim. The implication was that any reasons I had for accepting Christianity were irrelevant, since my being a Christian was really just a matter of geography.

Now, one problem with this kind of argument is that it commits the genetic fallacy: it assumes that you can invalidate a belief by explaining how the belief originated. This isn't a reliable type of argument because even if some person out there believes in the Christian God just because they grew up in America, that fact alone does not prove that the Christian God isn't real. The same person might also believe that fairies don't exist purely because their parents told them so, but in that case at least, their belief is correct.

But the agnostic's argument against religious belief is also undercut by a version of the argument from reason. Remember, he's suggesting that one's religious beliefs are determined purely by their cultural context, but for this claim to be even remotely plausible, it would have to be extended to all beliefs, not just religious ones (in other words, it would be very peculiar if it was only our religious beliefs that were affected by our cultural context). Yet if all of our beliefs are determined (and, by his logic, invalidated) by one's cultural context, that will also include his belief that "all religious beliefs are determined by one's cultural context and therefore invalid." Notice that this doesn't just undercut his conclusion about religion. If he's right, then all of our beliefs are invalid. But since we are obviously capable of drawing valid inferences, his belief must be wrong. One's beliefs about religion really are capable of being held on rational grounds (regardless of whether those beliefs are true or false).

In response, the agnostic man could try to qualify his claim by saying that even if one's religious beliefs are not determined by one's cultural context, the probability that one will embrace a particular religious identity is surely affected by one's cultural context. By itself, this claim does not seem problematic to me. In fact, I think it's probably correct. But if we're meant to conclude that religious beliefs are therefore unreliable, then the argument from reason reasserts itself. For while the probability that one will embrace a particular religious identity is almost certainly affected by one's cultural context, it would be implausible to say that this same reasoning doesn't also apply to the probability that one will consciously embrace a non-religious identity. Given that this man grew up in the United States, the probability of his openly endorsing a position of agnosticism seems far more likely than if he had grown up in Saudi Arabia. If this means that one's beliefs about religion cannot be trusted, then the argument cannot succeed in lending any credibility to his preferred position of agnosticism.

More could be said about the shortcomings of this particular argument for agnosticism, but since it was only meant as an easy example, I will move on. This example was just meant to illustrate the kind of phenomenon that the argument from reason is focusing on. It's an argument based on the fact that we can, after all, make valid rational inferences.

Selves, Persons, Conscious States, and Thoughts

In the remainder of this post, I will look at the first of four arguments from reason that push me toward theism. This particular argument is aimed at one very specific kind of atheism that many atheists would themselves reject. Because of this, I normally wouldn't see much value in talking about it. But I think this version of the argument is important because the kind of atheism that it rules out has been championed by certain highly influential atheist writers and philosophers, and understanding why it doesn't work reveals some important things about the kind of world we live in.

So what kind of atheism are we talking about here? For many people, the existence of God is ruled out by their belief that there is nothing beyond the physical world of matter and energy. Obviously, there are a lot of atheists who see the world this way, but they don't always consider what follows. According to this particular view of the universe, everything that exists is the result of physical processes involving the movements of atoms and molecules. These processes play out according to the laws of physics. There is nothing guiding the atoms or molecules to move in certain ways. In other words, there is no purpose or intention, much less a cosmic mind, behind the way physical reality behaves.

At first glance, this seems like a very simple, straightforward view of reality. It may even seem to have a certain plausibility to it. But it has some very counterintuitive implications. If you want to see what I mean, take a look at The Atheist's Guide to Reality by a philosopher named Alex Rosenberg. In the book, Rosenberg argues that there are no such things as selves or persons, that there is no such thing as consciousness, and that, as a result, there are no such things as thoughts.

It's important to understand why he makes these striking claims. We all seem to have an inner mental life, in which we experience a number of conscious states (like pain or pleasure) and entertain a number of thoughts. When we reflect on our inner mental life like this, we are engaging in a process called introspection. For atheists like Rosenberg, introspection is a bad way to learn anything about the world. The only reliable way to learn anything is by resorting to scientific study of physical reality. But the problem is that, once you do that, you can't seem to find anything that fits the description of selves, persons, conscious states, or thoughts. Oh sure, there are certainly human beings with brains, and there are certainly brain states which depend on neural processes. But (on this view) those brain states are not "about" anything, the way that a thought is supposed to be about something or other. If thoughts don't exist as part of the brain, then assuming that the physical world is all there is, thoughts simply cannot exist. Nor can there be any such thing as consciousness. Pain and pleasure are nothing more (on this view) than the firing of certain neurons, which leads to certain behaviors from physical organisms. There is no mind inside the brain, so there is nothing there to experience consciousness.

Even more troubling, on this view there doesn't seem to be anything discernible to science that would count as a "self," or a person. It might be tempting to equate selves with brains, but what would this mean? The brain is just a physical blob of tissues made up of cells that process certain kinds of information. There is no correspondence between what we call a person and the physical object called a brain. In fact, if the brain gets damaged in a certain way, it can wreak havoc on a human's sense of being a unified "self." The brain still exists, but somehow the person does not. For reasons like these, many atheists conclude that ideas like selves, persons, conscious states, and thoughts are just illusions. In fact, that's the subtitle of Rosenberg's book: "Enjoying Life without Illusions."

Now, this type of atheism has a name. It's called eliminative materialism. It's important to reiterate that this type of atheism stems from the perceived impossibility of identifying selves, persons, conscious states, or thoughts with physical objects or processes. Even though there are certainly many atheists who would reject these arguments, it still seems to me that most atheists (whether they embrace eliminative materialism or not) are skeptical of the existence of non-physical minds or persons who can causally interact with the physical world. Atheists like Rosenberg just take that to what seems to be its logical conclusion: if minds don't exist, then obviously neither do thoughts or conscious states, since there is nothing there to think those thoughts or experience those states. And if persons can't exist without having a mind, then persons must not exist either. We are just biological organisms acting in line with physical and chemical processes that are entirely the result of physical forces. Everything we think we know through introspection is an illusion.

Of course, anything I say in attempting to refute eliminative materialism will inevitably depend on things I claim to know through introspection. For instance, I could say that, obviously, I do exist as a person. How do I know? Because I wouldn't be here to write a blog if I didn't! And obviously I have thoughts. I am thinking about atheism right now! But the materialist could always object that these are not scientific arguments. Does this result in a stalemate? Hardly. For one thing, the fact that we know things through introspection seems to immediately undermine any claim that we don't. If someone tells me that "I" don't really exist, I have no reason whatsoever to take them seriously. It just makes no sense to say that “you” are being tricked into thinking that you exist. If you don’t exist, then there shouldn’t be anyone there to experience the illusion. Obviously, you exist! And so does the person arguing against the existence of selves. If "they" don't really exist, then there is literally nobody there to even make this argument.

This last comment brings us to the second problem with this kind of atheism, and this is where the argument from reason comes in. One cannot conclude that eliminative materialism is true without making some questionable rational inferences. Notice that in explaining what eliminative materialism entails, I've had to appeal to the sorts of reasons and lines of evidence that the materialist might appeal to in order to justify their denial of selves, persons, conscious states, or thoughts. We can represent the argument from eliminative materialism as follows:

1. If eliminative materialism is true, then there are no selves, persons, conscious states, or thoughts.
2. Eliminative materialism is true.
3. Therefore, there are no selves, persons, conscious states, or thoughts.

But now consider what it takes (or at least, some of what it takes) to follow an argument to its logical conclusion and draw a rational inference: First, there needs to be continuity between who is considering the premises of an argument and who is drawing the conclusion. Conclusions don't draw themselves, and atoms and molecules are not in the business of following arguments. If a rational conclusion has been inferred, there must be someone there who inferred it, and the person who draws the conclusion must be the same person who considered the premises (which implies that personal identity is maintained over time). If people don't exist, then nobody has ever made a rational inference before, and thus nobody has ever succeeded in showing that eliminative materialism is true.

Second, to draw a valid conclusion based on a logical inference, one must be able to think about the argument. In other words, one needs to consider its claims and weigh the evidence. This would be impossible if there was no such thing as thinking about stuff. One cannot affirm eliminative materialism without thinking about it.

Finally, in order to consider an argument and make a rational inference, a person needs to be aware of the argument. Indeed, they need to have awareness of the argument's premises and of the meaning of its different terms, and at some level they need to grasp the logical laws or principles that determine whether an inference can be made rationally. If there are no conscious states, then there is nothing that could possibly have awareness of anything presenting an argument from eliminative materialism.

In short, eliminative materialism refutes itself because the only way it can possibly assert itself on reasonable grounds is by assuming that rational inferences are possible, yet it denies this possibility by denying some of the necessary conditions for making a rational argument in the first place. This corroborates several things that we already know (if we're being honest) through introspection: that there are such things as selves and persons, that we do experience different conscious states, and that we really can think about things.

As a result, we have our first argument from reason:

1. If eliminative materialism is true, then there are no selves, persons, conscious states, or thoughts.
2. But there are selves, persons, conscious states, and thoughts. [required by our ability to make rational inferences]
3. Therefore, eliminative materialism is false.

Now obviously, this does not refute atheism altogether, much less prove that God is real. We've merely shown that the conclusion of the argument for eliminative materialism cannot be correct, since one could never rationally affirm it. The goal, then, is to figure out where eliminative materialism goes wrong. In order to think more carefully about this, we can restate the argument from eliminative materialism more carefully:

1. If physical, material reality is all there is, then human cognitive activity is indistinguishable from brain activity.
2. If human cognitive activity is indistinguishable from brain activity, then there are no selves, persons, conscious states, or thoughts.
3. Science proves that physical, material reality is all there is.
4. Therefore, science proves that human cognitive activity is indistinguishable from brain activity. (1, 3)
5. Therefore, science proves that there are no selves, persons, conscious states, or thoughts. (2, 4)

Since the conclusion of this argument is false, then at least one of the premises in this argument must be false. Personally, I happen to think that premises (1) and (2) are both plausible, but many atheists would reject one or both of them. On the other hand, I wholeheartedly reject premise (3), whereas many atheists would accept it. However, notice that, whichever premise we reject, we must acknowledge that the only way to construct a plausible view of reality is by taking things like persons, consciousness, and thinking into account. Either there is more to reality than the interactions of physical particles, or there will have to be a more plausible way to account for selves, persons, conscious states, and thoughts in terms of physical causes.